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This paper studies coordination in a three-echelon supply chain and examines the impact of sub-supply
chain coordination (sub-coordination). Our analysis is based on the price-only contracts that are
commonly used in practice. The model is of the newsvendor type. We consider the following cases: no
coordination between any members of the supply chain (decentralized), coordination between only
two members (sub-supply chain coordination) and coordination of the whole supply chain as a
benchmark. We explicitly analyze the order quantity and contracting decisions for a decentralized
three-echelon supply chain. We compare supply chain efﬁciency when there is upstream coordination
and when there is downstream coordination and show that the former is more efﬁcient than or as
efﬁcient as the latter. In our setting, the difference between upstream and downstream sub-supply
chain coordination is equivalent to the shortage cost transfer. We ﬁnd that both the supplier and the
retailer would prefer to act alone rather than to coordinate with the manufacturer when sub-supply
chain coordination is suggested. This contradiction may partly explain the popularity of price-only
contracts in practice.
& 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.67
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871. Introduction
During the last few decades, a rich literature has developed for
analyzing the supply chain (SC) coordination issues. Supply chain
coordination can be achieved through a centralized decision
process or through coordination mechanisms such as supply chain
contracts to incentivize decentralized actors to behave coherently
with one another. Different models of coordinating contracts have
been proposed in the literature. Popular examples include buy-
back contracts or return policies (Pasternack, 1985), whereby the
supplier allows the buyer to return unsold products at an agreed
price; revenue-sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005),
whereby the supplier offers a low wholesale price to the retailer,
who in turn shares a proportion of his revenue with the supplier;
and an innovative inventory policy called consignment stock
(Valentini and Zavanella, 2003; Piplani and Viswanathan, 2003),
whereby the supplier holds and manages inventories in the
retailer’s warehouse and the retailer purchases them only at the
moment of use. Other contracts are also commonly studied, such
as quantity ﬂexibility contracts (Tsay, 1999), quantity discounts89
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93
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of Production Economics ((Weng, 1995), backup agreements (Eppen and Iyer, 1997), sales
rebate contracts (Taylor, 2002) and options (Barnes-Schuster et al.,
2002). We refer the reader to the comprehensive surveys in
Cachon (2003) and Tsay et al. (1999) for more details.
Although supply chain coordination should increase the
expected total supply chain proﬁts, in practice, due to accounting
and information sharing constraints between the members of a
supply chain, coordinating contracts are often difﬁcult to imple-
ment. To date, price-only contracts are still popular, even if their
use does not lead to coordination of the whole supply chain.
Lariviere and Porteus (2001) point out that, ‘‘Given the complex-
ity of supply chains, price-only contracts may owe their popular-
ity to their simplicity.’’ Similarly, Cachon (2003) states that, ‘‘Even
though the wholesale-price contract does not coordinate the
supply chain, the wholesale-price contract is worth studying
because it is commonly observed in practice.’’
The majority of the existing literature addresses contract
problems in supply chains made up of two echelons. For example,
He and Zhang (2008) study a simple supply chain with one
supplier and one retailer where there is random yield production
and uncertain demand. Jung et al. (2008) propose a negotiation
process to ﬁnd a contract for a distributor and a manufacturer in a
supply chain. Wang and Liu (2007) develop a model to study
channel coordination and risk sharing in a retailer-led supply
chain. Chen (2011) discusses the wholesale price-only contract as95
on supply chain with price-only contracts and sub-supply
2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2012.04.006
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R.W. Seifert et al. / Int. J. Production Economics ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]2a benchmark and proposes a returns-discount contract between a
manufacturer and a retailer. Some studies on consignment stock
policy consider single-supplier single-retailer supply chain by
taking into account the risk of obsolescence (Persona et al., 2005),
high demand variation coupled with space limitation (Battini et al.,
2010a) and learning and forgetting effects (Zanoni et al., 2011).
Zavanella and Zanoni (2009) and Battini et al. (2010b) extend to a
single-supplier and multi-retailer situation, in which one or more
retailers establish a consignment stock policy with the supplier.
In practice, however, supply chains typically contain three or more
echelons.
In the literature, not many papers have considered multi-
echelon supply chains. Munson and Rosenblatt (2001) study the
coordination of a three-echelon supply chain with quantity
discounts assuming deterministic demand. They consider a multi-
ple-period inventory control model based on the classic economic
order quantity (EOQ) model. Jaber et al. (2006) consider price
discounts, price-dependent demand, and proﬁt-sharing in a three-
echelon supply chain model. Jaber and Goyal (2008) investigate
the coordination of order quantities among the players in a three-
echelon supply chain with a centralized decision process, allow-
ing for more than one player at each echelon. Jaber et al. (2010)
study three-echelon supply chain coordination with learning-
based continuous improvement and constant demand. Khouja
(2003) and Lee and Moon (2006) likewise assume deterministic
demand and employ the EOQ model.
More recent studies consider the coordination of a three-echelon
supply chain based on the classic single-period newsvendor model
with stochastic demand. Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004)
propose a model with a revenue-sharing contract used by both
upstream and downstream supply chain members, which coordi-
nates the three-echelon supply chain. They show that all supply
chain actors’ proﬁts can be improved by carefully selecting the
contract parameters. Ding and Chen (2008) show that a three-
echelon supply chain can be fully coordinated with ﬂexible buyback
contracts, which allows for all the channel proﬁt to be divided
freely among the ﬁrms. He and Zhao (2011) study a three-echelon
supply chain with both demand and supply uncertainty. They
propose an agreement that includes a buyback policy between
the manufacturer and the retailer, but stipulates a price-only
contract between the supplier and the manufacturer. They show
that such an agreement can achieve perfect supply chain coordina-
tion and result in a win–win situation.
All of the studies mentioned above explicitly consider a three-
echelon supply chain and aim to achieve coordination across the
whole supply chain. However, it should be noted that, in practice,
many difﬁculties remain when it comes to implementing such
coordination schemes for all supply chain members. For instance,
geographical constraints, additional administrative burdens, per-
formance measurement and incentives at individual ﬁrms based
on a local perspective, dynamically interchanging products, and
the like (see Kanda and Deshmukh, 2008) all get in the way of
more elaborate coordination mechanisms. It is thus reasonable to
expect that coordination of the whole supply chain will be more
difﬁcult to achieve than coordination between only some of its
members. For example, in the case of a supplier–manufacturer–
retailer supply chain, we might expect that coordination between
the manufacturer and the retailer would be easier to achieve than
coordination among all three parties. Petersen et al. (2005) report
that 42% of a sub-sample of companies contacted indicated that
‘‘they do not use linked information systems to do planning with
their suppliers.’’ This shows that a non-negligible percentage of
ﬁrms do not coordinate with their suppliers, and perfect information
symmetry is rarely achieved across a multi-echelon supply chain.
In this paper we thus consider a three-echelon (supplier–
manufacturer–retailer) supply chain with price-only contracts andPlease cite this article as: Seifert, R.W., et al., A three-echel
chain coordination. International Journal of Production Economics (sub-supply chain coordination. The model is of the newsvendor
type. The supplier provides raw materials to the manufacturer. The
manufacturer sells ﬁnished products to the retailer. The demand is
random and occurs at the retail level. The retailer sells at a constant
selling price that is exogenously determined. We consider the
following cases in detail: a decentralized supply chain (no coordi-
nation between any members), an upstream-coordinated supply
chain (coordination between supplier and manufacturer) and a
downstream-coordinated supply chain (coordination between
manufacturer and retailer). We also discuss a centralized/coordi-
nated supply chain as a benchmark.
Our study differs from prior work in two major aspects. First,
instead of pursuing coordination across the whole supply chain,
we study the sub-supply chain coordination problem in a three-
echelon supply chain. Second, we explicitly analyze the optimal
order quantity for the supplier in a decentralized three-echelon
supply chain. With this focus in mind, we begin by investigating
the shortage cost transfer effect in a two-echelon supply chain.
We then analyze the order quantity and contracting decisions in a
decentralized three-echelon supply chain. Finally, we analyze the
impact of sub-supply chain coordination on the supplier’s optimal
order quantity, on the whole supply chain’s proﬁt and on the
individual ﬁrms’ proﬁts. We note that in our setting the difference
between upstream and downstream sub-supply chain coordination
is equivalent to the shortage cost transfer. Using this equivalence,
we show that upstream coordination is preferable to downstream
coordination. In addition, both the supplier and the retailer would
prefer to act alone rather than to coordinate with the manufacturer
when sub-supply chain coordination is suggested.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic setting
of the model is described. In Section 3 we provide a review of
previous results for price-only contracts in a two-echelon supply
chain framework. In Section 4 we investigate the shortage cost
transfer effect in a two-echelon supply chain. In Section 5 we
study a decentralized three-echelon supply chain under price-
only contracts. In Section 6 we study the impact of sub-supply
chain coordination. We consider two scenarios, upstream and
downstream sub-supply chain coordination. In Section 7 we
present numerical examples to illustrate our results. In Section
8 we conclude the paper.2. Assumptions and notations
We consider a three-echelon supply chain composed of a
supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer; we assume that all three
ﬁrms are risk neutral and seek to maximize expected proﬁt. We
assume that product demand D follows a continuous distribution
with cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (x) and probability
distribution function (PDF) f (x). Both F(x) and f (x) are differenti-
able, and the support of F is ½a,b, 0oaobr1. Let F ðxÞ ¼ 1FðxÞ
and m¼ E½D. We assume that the lead time for the product is
much longer than its selling season. Thus the ﬁrms have only one
ordering opportunity.
We follow a standard sequence of events as follows. The
supplier offers the manufacturer a contract. The manufacturer
offers a contract to the retailer. Assuming that all ﬁrms accept the
contracts, the retailer determines the order quantity q from the
manufacturer, and the manufacturer orders the raw materials
from the supplier. For simplicity, we assume that a ﬁnal product
requires one raw material. The supplier provides the raw materi-
als. The manufacturer receives the raw materials, produces the
products and delivers them to the retailer before the selling
season. The demand is realized. Firms are penalized by shortage
costs, and transfer payments are made between the coordinated
ﬁrms according to their contracts. In this paper, we assume that ifon supply chain with price-only contracts and sub-supply
2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2012.04.006
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serves as the Stackelberg leader (see Cachon, 2003) and the other
ﬁrm acts as the follower.
We use the following notation.
Decision variables
q quantity ordered by the retailer
t wholesale price per unit of raw material determined by
the supplier
w wholesale price per unit of product determined by the
manufacturer
Parameters
p retailer’s ﬁxed sale price per unit of ﬁnal product
cs supplier’s production cost per unit
cm manufacturer’s value-added cost per unit
cr retailer’s treating cost per unit
gs supplier’s shortage penalty cost per unit of unmet demand
gm manufacturer’s shortage penalty cost per unit of unmet
demand
gr retailer’s shortage penalty cost per unit of unmet
demand
v salvage revenue (at the retailer) for each unit of the ﬁnal
unsold product
D nonnegative customer demand, with CDF, F(x) and PDF f(x)
m mean of customer demand D
s standard deviation of customer demand D during the
period of interest
In order to avoid trial cases, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. p4wþcr ,w4tþcm, and t4cs.
Assumption 2. csþcmþcr4v.
The ﬁrst assumption makes sure that each ﬁrm is willing to
participate. The second assumption ensures that the chain will
not produce inﬁnite products.107
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1333. Previous results on price-only contracts
In this section, we brieﬂy revisit the price-only contract that
underpins our model, based on the analysis by Cachon (2003) and
Lariviere and Porteus (2001). The supply chain is made up of two
echelons: a manufacturer and a retailer. In this section, we denote
all variables related to the manufacturer and retailer by 2 and 1,
respectively.
We assume that c2þc1Zv, g2,g140, p4c2þc1. Let S(q) be
the expected number of units sold. We recall that
SðqÞ ¼
Z q
o
F ðxÞ dx:
Then we have the expected inventory after the selling season
EðqDÞþ ¼ qSðqÞ and the expected lost sales EðDqÞþ ¼ mSðqÞ.
As a performance benchmark, the total expected proﬁt of the
integrated supply chain for the order quantity q is
P^T ðqÞ ¼ pSðqÞþvðqSðqÞÞgðmSðqÞÞcq
¼ ðpvþgÞSðqÞðcvÞqgm,
where c¼ c2þc1 and g ¼ g2þg1. The optimal solution of this
concave problem is
F ðqnT Þ ¼
cv
pvþg :Please cite this article as: Seifert, R.W., et al., A three-echel
chain coordination. International Journal of Production Economics (In the decentralized case under the price-only contract, given
the wholesale price w determined by the manufacturer, the
retailer’s and manufacturer’s expected proﬁt functions, which
are denoted by p^1ðqÞ and p^2ðqÞ, respectively, are given by the
following equations:
p^1ðqÞ ¼ pSðqÞþvðqSðqÞÞg1ðmSðqÞÞc1qwq
¼ ðpvþg1ÞSðqÞðwþc1vÞqg1m,
p^2ðqÞ ¼wqc2qg2ðmSðqÞÞ
¼ g2SðqÞþðwc2Þqg2m: ð1Þ
The retailer’s optimal order quantity is
F ðqn1Þ ¼
wþc1v
pvþg1
:
There is a one-for-one mapping between w and qn1 (Cachon, 2003),
and the inverse demand curve for the retailer is
wðqÞ ¼ ðpvþg1ÞF ðqÞðc1vÞ: ð2Þ
As the Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer anticipates per-
fectly the retailer’s order quantity for any wholesale price. Facing
the inverse demand curve (2), the manufacturer’s expected proﬁt
function becomes
p^2ðqÞ ¼ g2SðqÞþðpvþg1ÞqF ðqÞðcvÞqg2m:
Lariviere and Porteus (2001) note that if the manufacturer’s
marginal proﬁt
@
@q
p^2ðqÞ ¼ F ðqÞ ðpvþgÞðpvþg1Þ
qf ðqÞ
F ðqÞ
 
ðcvÞ ð3Þ
is decreasing, then p^2ðqÞ is unimodal, and the optimal manufac-
turer order quantity satisﬁes
ðpvþgÞF ðqÞðpvþg1Þqf ðqÞðcvÞ ¼ 0: ð4Þ
The generalized failure rate (GFR) z(x) (Lariviere and Porteus,
2001) of a random variable X with distribution F is
zðxÞ ¼ xf ðxÞ
F ðxÞ :
An IGFR distribution is a distribution with an increasing GFR.
When the distribution of the demand is IGFR we will say
interchangeably that the demand is IGFR. Knowing that F ðqÞ is
decreasing, the manufacturer’s marginal proﬁt (3) is decreasing if
qf ðqÞ=F ðqÞ is increasing.
Let q be the largest q for which the following inequality holds:
zðqÞr pvþg
pvþg1
:
The following result characterizes the optimal manufacturer
order quantity in our setting.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the demand is IGFR, then
(i) p^2ðqÞ is concave in ½a,q and decreasing in ½q,1.
(ii) Any solution qn2 of Eq. (4) is unique and must lie in the interval
½a,q. The manufacturer’s optimal order quantity is qn2.
Proof. See Lariviere and Porteus (2001) for the proof of their
Theorem 1. &
In general, a price-only contract cannot coordinate the supply
chain (Cachon, 2003), namely, p^2ðqn2Þþ p^1ðqn2ÞoP^T ðqnT Þ. This is
due to the well-known ‘‘double marginalization’’ problem shown
by Spengler (1950).
4. Shortage cost transfer
In this section we analyze the effect of shortage cost transfer in
a two-echelon supply chain. This effect will be used in ouron supply chain with price-only contracts and sub-supply
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where we show that the difference between upstream and
downstream coordination in a three-echelon supply chain is
equivalent to the shortage cost transfer between the members
of the supply chain.
Lemma 1. Consider a price-only contract between the members of a
two-echelon supply chain. Suppose that the demand is IGFR and that
g ¼ g1þg2 remains constant when g1 varies. Then qn2 decreases when
g1 increases.
Proof. Let us deﬁne the following function
Gðqn2,g1Þ ¼ F ðqn2Þ½ðpvþgÞðpvþg1Þzðqn2ÞðcvÞ:
The implicit function qn2ðg1Þ as a function of g1 is given by the
equation Gðqn2,g1Þ ¼ 0. Thus
@qn2ðg1Þ
@g1
¼
@Gðqn2,g1Þ
@g1
@Gðqn2,g1Þ
@qn2
¼ zðq
n
2Þ
f ðqnÞ
F ðqn2Þ
½ðpvþgÞðpvþg1Þzðqn2Þþðpvþg1Þz0ðqn2Þ
,
where z0ðxÞ denotes the ﬁrst derivative of the function z(x). Then
the lemma follows from Theorem 1. &
Note that g is usually considered as a loss-of-goodwill penalty
when there is a shortage and demand for the product is realized.
This loss of goodwill can frequently be considered constant, given
that it depends on the subjective response of the customer in
relation to a shortage, and independent of the number of echelons
in the supply chain, since usually the ﬁnal customer is not aware
of the supply chain of a product. In some cases, though, the ﬁnal
customer has information on several echelons of the supply chain,
which can lead to a ‘‘transfer of loss of goodwill’’ between the
members of the supply chain. For example, for well-known
brands with high brand recognition, a shortage at a retailer can
lead to a loss of goodwill for both the brand and the retailer. By
contrast, if the brand recognition of the product is low (e.g., a
retailer’s private label product), the costumer will perceive that
the retailer is not reliable, i.e., most of the loss-of-goodwill
penalty will be attributed to the retailer. The brand recognition
level will thus determine the shortage cost transfer between the
manufacturer and the retailer.
Theorem 2. Consider a price-only contract between the members of
a two-echelon supply chain. Suppose that the demand is IGFR and
g ¼ g1þg2 remains constant when g1 varies. Then
119(i)Ple
chp^1ðqn2Þ decreases when g1 increases.
121(ii) p^2ðq
n
2Þ increases with g1.(iii) p^1ðqn2Þþ p^2ðqn2Þ decreases when g1 increases.
123
125
127
129
131
133Proof. The retailer’s proﬁt associated with the optimal manufac-
turer order quantity qn2 is obtained from Eqs. (1) and (2),
p^1ðqn2Þ ¼ ðpvþg1Þ½Sðqn2Þqn2F ðqn2Þg1m:
We have
@p^1ðqn2Þ
@g1
¼ @p^1ðq
n
2,g1Þ
@g1
þ @p^1ðq
n
2,g1Þ
@qn2
@qn2ðg1Þ
@g1
, ð5Þ
where we write p^1ðqn2,g1Þ to express the retailer’s proﬁt as a
function of both qn2 and g1.ase cite this article as: Seifert, R.W., et al., A three-echel
ain coordination. International Journal of Production Economics (We consider ﬁrst the derivative of the retailer’s proﬁt with
respect to g1 without considering the dependence of q
n
2 with
respect to g1.
@p^1ðqn2,g1Þ
@g1
¼½qn2F ðqn2ÞþðmSðqn2ÞÞ: ð6Þ
Eq. (6) proves (i) for the case when qn2 is constant as a function
of g1.
Next, we consider the variation in proﬁt due to the dependence
of the optimal order quantity qn2 on g1. We ﬁrst consider the
derivative of the retailer’s proﬁt with respect to qn2.
@p^1ðqn2,g1Þ
@qn2
¼ ðpvþg1Þqn2f ðqn2Þ:
Then from Eq. (5) and Lemma 1 the following inequality is
obtained:
@p^1ðqn2Þ
@g1
r0,
and we have demonstrated (i).
For the manufacturer’s proﬁt we have
@p^2ðqn2Þ
@g1
¼ @p^2ðq
n
2,g1Þ
@g1
þ @p^2ðq
n
2,g1Þ
@qn2
@qn2ðg1Þ
@g1
:
But the ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) for qn2 guarantees that
@p^2ðqn2,g1Þ
@qn2
¼ 0:
Then
@p^2ðqn2Þ
@g1
¼ @p^2ðq
n
2,g1Þ
@g1
¼ qn2F ðqn2ÞþðmSðqn2ÞÞ:
Therefore (ii) and (iii) follow. &
In a two-echelon supply chain with a price-only contract,
Theorem 2 shows ﬁrst that the efﬁciency of the supply chain
(the ratio of supply chain proﬁt to the centralized optimal proﬁt)
decreases when the retailer’s shortage cost g1 increases. From
Lemma 1 we see that the manufacturer’s optimal order quantity
decreases when g1 increases. In accordance with the concavity of
the proﬁt of the whole supply chain, we can also expect the
supply chain’s efﬁciency to decrease when g1 increases. Second,
Theorem 2 indicates that the proﬁt share of the upstream ﬁrm
(the manufacturer) increases when the shortage cost is trans-
ferred to the downstream ﬁrm (the retailer) by increasing g1, and
at the same time, the proﬁt of downstream ﬁrm decreases.
The results in this section show that under a price-only
contract model with the manufacturer as the leader, it is not
favorable for the whole supply chain if the retailer’s shortage
penalty is increased. However, the manufacturer could beneﬁt
from this shortage penalty transfer.
In the context of our prior reference to relative brand recogni-
tion, the split of the shortage penalty between a manufacturer
and a retailer can be understood as follows: Suppose that the
manufacturer sells a well-known, high quality brand. She will be
interested in avoiding high shortage penalties for the retailer
when it comes to optimizing the whole supply chain, because in
this way customers will be more likely to revisit the store.
When it comes to maximizing her own proﬁt, the situation
changes. The manufacturer will be interested in transferring
most of the shortage penalty to the retailer. As the retailer willon supply chain with price-only contracts and sub-supply
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the manufacturer enjoys strong brand recognition for its product
in retail.71
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1255. A three-echelon decentralized supply chain
In this section we consider a three-echelon decentralized
supply chain with proﬁt-maximizing supplier, manufacturer and
retailer. Both supplier and manufacturer offer price-only con-
tracts to their downstream ﬁrm.
Given the wholesale prices determined by the supplier and the
manufacturer, the proﬁts for each member of the supply chain
become
prðqÞ ¼ ðpvþgrÞSðqÞðwþcrvÞqgrm,
pmðqÞ ¼ gmSðqÞþðwcmtÞqgmm,
psðqÞ ¼ gsSðqÞþðtcsÞqgsm:
As a benchmark, let us consider the total expected proﬁt of the
coordinated supply chain for order quantity q given by
PT ðqÞ ¼ prþpmþps ¼ ðpvþgÞSðqÞðcvÞqgm,
where c¼ csþcmþcr and g ¼ gsþgmþgr . The optimal order
quantity qn for the coordinated supply chain satisﬁes
ðpvþgÞF ðqnÞ ¼ cv:
As in Section 3, given the retailer’s inverse demand Eq. (7),
wðqÞ ¼ ðpvþgrÞF ðqÞðcrvÞ, ð7Þ
the proﬁt for the manufacturer, anticipating the optimal response
of the retailer, is
pmðqÞ ¼ gmSðqÞþðpvþgrÞqF ðqÞðcmþcrvþtÞqgmm:
We have
@
@q
pmðqÞ ¼ ðpvþgmþgrÞF ðqÞðpvþgrÞqf ðqÞðcmþcrvþtÞ:
Then the inverse demand curve for the manufacturer is
tðqÞ ¼ ðpvþgmþgrÞF ðqÞðpvþgrÞqf ðqÞðcmþcrvÞ: ð8Þ
The proﬁt for the supplier, anticipating the optimal response of
the manufacturer, is
psðqÞ ¼ gsSðqÞþðpvþgmþgrÞqF ðqÞðpvþgrÞq2f ðqÞðcvÞqgsm:
And the supplier’s marginal proﬁt is
@
@q
psðqÞ ¼ ðpvþgÞF ðqÞðpvþgmþgrÞqf ðqÞ
ðpvþgrÞ½2qf ðqÞþq2f 0ðqÞðcvÞ
¼ ðpvþgÞF ðqÞgmqf ðqÞ
ðpvþgrÞ½3qf ðqÞþq2f 0ðqÞðcvÞ:
In the text that follows, we analyze the characteristics of the
supplier’s optimal order quantity in a decentralized three-echelon
supply chain.
Theorem 3. Suppose that127
1.P
cF is IGFR.
2. 3zðqÞþq2f 0ðqÞ=F ðqÞ increases with q.129
131
133Then: (i) psðqÞ is concave in ½a,qs and decreasing in ½qs,1, where qs
is the greatest qZ0 for which the following inequality holds:
ðpvþgÞZgmzðqÞþðpvþgrÞ 3zðqÞþq2
f 0ðqÞ
F ðqÞ
 
:lease cite this article as: Seifert, R.W., et al., A three-echel
hain coordination. International Journal of Production Economics ((ii) Any solution qns of Eq. (9) is unique and must lie in the interval
½a,qs. The supplier’s optimal order quantity is qns .
ðpvþgÞF ðqÞgmqf ðqÞðpvþgrÞ½3qf ðqÞþq2f 0ðqÞ ¼ ðcvÞ: ð9Þ
Proof. Let us write Eq. (9) in the following way.
F ðqÞ ðpvþgÞgm
qf ðqÞ
F ðqÞ ðpvþgrÞ 3
qf ðqÞ
F ðqÞ þq
2 f
0ðqÞ
F ðqÞ
  
¼ ðcvÞ:
ð10Þ
Because of Conditions 1 and 2 in Theorem 3, the left-hand side
(LHS) of Eq. (10) is positive and decreasing in the interval ½a,qs.
Then the supplier’s marginal proﬁt ð@=@qÞpsðqÞ is positive and
decreasing. The supplier’s proﬁt psðqÞ is concave in this interval.
ð@=@qÞpsðqÞ is negative in the interval ½qs,1 then psðqÞ decreases.
This proves the result (i). psðqÞ is concave in ½a,qs and decreases in
½qs,1. Then (ii) follows. &
The supplier’s problem in a three-echelon supply chain with
price-only contracts (Eq. (9)) is less easy to analyze than the
manufacturer’s problem in a two-echelon supply chain with
price-only contracts. However, we ﬁnd that Condition 2 in
Theorem 3 holds for some commonly utilized demand distribu-
tions (Cachon, 2003), such as uniform distribution, normal dis-
tribution in the interval ½0rqrm=2, exponential distribution
(Lariviere and Porteus, 1999) in the interval ½0rqr3m=2 and
power function FðxÞ ¼ ðx=yÞk, 0rxry, kZ0.
In this section, we explicitly analyzed on the optimal order
quantity of the supplier, who serves as the Stackelberg leader in a
decentralized three-echelon supply chain. We also studied the
implicit contracting decisions and the expected proﬁts of the
supply chain members.6. Sub-supply chain coordination
We now consider the case in which coordination is achieved
between only two members of the supply chain. The cost
contributions (shortage and production costs) of the sub-supply
chain are calculated as the sum of the costs of its two members
(e.g., the shortage cost for the coordinated manufacturer–retailer
sub-supply chain becomes gmþgr).
Consider that the retailer and the manufacturer are coordi-
nated with a total proﬁt p^mr . This coordination could be achieved
simply by having a single decision maker who decides the order
quantity for both ﬁrms, or by a coordinating contract such as a
buyback or a revenue-sharing contract. In this supply chain, the
supplier acts as the Stackelberg leader and the coordinated
manufacturer–retailer acts as the follower. The proﬁts associated
with these two players are the following:
p^s ¼ gsSðqÞcsqgsmþtq:
p^mr ¼ ðpvþgmþgrÞSðqÞðcmþcrvÞqðgmþgrÞmtq:
Remark 1. Note that p^mr and p^s are written as p^1 and p^2,
respectively, in Eq. (1), with g1 ¼ gmþgr , g2 ¼ gs, c1 ¼ cmþcr and
c2 ¼ cs.
Consider now that the supplier and the manufacturer are
coordinated. As for the downstream coordination mentioned
above, the upstream coordination could be achieved simply by
having a common decision maker, or by a coordinating contract
such as a revenue-sharing contract. In this case, the coordinated
supplier–manufacturer acts as the leader and the retailer acts ason supply chain with price-only contracts and sub-supply
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p^sm ¼ ðgsþgmÞSðqÞðcsþcmÞqðgsþgmÞmþwq
p^r ¼ ðpvþgrÞSðqÞðcrvÞqgrmwq:
Remark 2. Note that p^r and p^sm are written as p^1 and p^2,
respectively, in Eq. (1), with g1 ¼ gr , g2 ¼ gsþgm, c1 ¼ cr and
c2 ¼ cmþcs.
From Remarks 1 and 2, we can see that a three-echelon
supply chain including one ﬁrm acting alone with the other
two being coordinated, can be considered as a two-echelon
supply chain.
We denote the wholesale price determined by the leader in the
downstream-(upstream-)coordinated supply chain by ts,mr (wsm,r).
From Eq. (2) we obtain the following result:
@
@q
ts,mrðqÞ

Z @@qwsm,rðqÞ

:
That is, when there is coordination downstream the wholesale
price is more sensitive to the decision variable for a given value
of q.91
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1256.1. Impact on the supplier’s optimal order quantity and the whole
chain’s proﬁt
In this section we compare the Stackelberg leader’s optimal
order quantity and the whole supply chain’s proﬁt for the two
types of sub-supply chain coordination mentioned above and the
decentralized supply chain.
Theorem 4. Suppose that F is IGFR. We denote the optimal order
quantity for the leader in an upstream-coordinated and a down-
stream-coordinated supply chain by qnsm,r and q
n
s,mr , respectively.
Then we have qnsm,rZq
n
s,mr .
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 1, and Remarks 1 and 2. &
We denote the whole proﬁt associated with the Stackelberg
leader’s optimal order quantity for an upstream-coordinated and
a downstream-coordinated supply chain by Psm,rðqnsm,rÞ and
Ps,mrðqns,mrÞ, respectively. Because of the concavity of the supply
chain proﬁt we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. Under the same conditions of Theorem 4 we obtain that
Psm,rðqnsm,rÞZPs,mrðqns,mrÞ:
This indicates that the efﬁciency of the upstream-coordinated
supply chain is greater than or equal to the efﬁciency of the
downstream-coordinated supply chain. From the point of view of
the whole supply chain’s proﬁt, it is better to coordinate the
upstream ﬁrms than the downstream ones.
Theorem 5. Suppose that the following conditions hold:1271.P
cF is IGFR.
2. 2f ðqÞ=F ðqÞþqf 0ðqÞ=F ðqÞZ0.129
131
133We denote the optimal order quantity for the supplier in the
decentralized supply chain by qns,m,r , then we have q
n
s,mrZq
n
s,m,r .
Proof. The optimal order quantity for the supplier in the
downstream-coordinated supply chain qns,mr is the solutionlease cite this article as: Seifert, R.W., et al., A three-echel
hain coordination. International Journal of Production Economics (of Eq. (11).
ðpvþgÞF ðqÞðpvþgmþgrÞqf ðqÞ ¼ ðcvÞ: ð11Þ
And qns,m,r is a solution of Eq. (12), which is equivalent to Eq. (9).
ðpvþgÞF ðqÞðpvþgmþgrÞqf ðqÞ
ðpvþgrÞ½2qf ðqÞþq2f 0ðqÞ ¼ ðcvÞ: ð12Þ
Then the result follows from the ordering of the LHS of Eqs. (12)
and (11). &
As for Condition 2 in Theorem 3, Condition 2 in Theorem 5
holds for some commonly used demand distributions, e.g., uni-
form distribution, normal distribution in the interval ½0rqr
m=2þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2s2þm2=4
p
, exponential distribution in the interval
½0rqr2m and power function FðxÞ ¼ ðx=yÞk, 0rxry, kZ0.
We denote the whole proﬁt for the decentralized supply chain
associated with the supplier’s optimal order quantity by
Ps,m,rðqns,m,rÞ. Because of the concavity of the whole supply chain
proﬁt, we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 5.
Corollary 2. Under the same conditions of Theorem 5 we obtain that
Ps,mrðqns,mrÞZPs,m,rðqns,m,rÞ:
The efﬁciency of the downstream-coordinated supply chain is
greater than or equal to the efﬁciency of the decentralized supply
chain. This indicates that the double marginalization is partly
mitigated by coordination between a subset of supply chain
members.
6.2. Impact on individual ﬁrms’ proﬁt
Next we analyze the impact of sub-supply chain coordination
on individual ﬁrms’ proﬁt, especially the proﬁts of the supplier
and the retailer who could act alone in such a supply chain.
Theorem 6. Suppose that the demand is IGFR. Then(i)on
201p^s;s,mrðqns,mrÞZ p^sm;sm,rðqnsm,rÞ, where p^s;s,mr is the supplier’s proﬁt
in the downstream-coordinated supply chain (s,mr) and p^sm;sm,r
is the sum of the proﬁts of the supplier and the manufacturer in
the upstream-coordinated supply chain (sm,rÞ.
(ii) p^r;sm,rðqnsm,rÞZ p^mr;s,mrðqns,mr), where p^r;sm,r is the retailer’s proﬁt
in the upstream-coordinated supply chain (sm,rÞ and p^mr;s,mr is
the sum of the proﬁts of the manufacturer and the retailer in the
downstream-coordinated supply chain (s,mrÞ.Proof. The result (i) follows from Remarks 1 and 2 and Theorem
2. Recall that in Corollary 1 we have Psm,rðqnsm,rÞZPs,mrðqns,mrÞ.
Because of the result (i), it is straightforward that p^r;sm,rðqnsm,rÞ
Z p^mr;s,mrðqns,mrÞ. &
The supplier’s share of the proﬁt in the s,mr supply chain is
greater than or equal to the share of the proﬁt of the coordinated
supplier–manufacturer in the sm,r supply chain. Consequently,
the supplier will be more interested in acting alone in a three-
echelon supply chain with sub-coordination, because she earns
more proﬁt than the total proﬁt when she coordinates with the
manufacturer.
Similarly, the retailer prefers to act alone in a three-echelon
supply chain with sub-coordination. Since the manufacturer’s
proﬁt in a supply chain with sub-coordination depends on
the manufacturer’s bargaining power in terms of sub-supply
chain proﬁt allocation, comparing the manufacturer’s proﬁt
between upstream and downstream sub-coordination is not
straightforward.supply chain with price-only contracts and sub-supply
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coordination: upstream and downstream. Our analysis shows that
the leader’s optimal order quantity and consequently the supply
chain’s efﬁciency is higher when there is upstream coordination
than when there is downstream coordination. From the point of
view of the whole supply chain, it is better to coordinate
upstream ﬁrms. However, from the point of view of individual
ﬁrms’ proﬁt, both the supplier and the retailer would prefer to act
alone rather than to coordinate with the manufacturer when sub-
supply chain coordination is suggested.
7. Numerical studies
This section illustrates our results with numerical analysis. We
adopt the price and cost parameter setting of Ding and Chen
(2008) and He and Zhao (2011) as follows: p¼ 150,v¼ 15,
c¼ 60,g ¼ 12: The demand is assumed to follow a uniform
distribution with mean m¼ 1000 and support ½0;2000. In
Section 7.1 we ﬁrst demonstrate the shortage cost transfer effect
in a two-echelon supply chain. In Section 7.2 we focus on supply
chains that include three echelons.
7.1. Two-echelon shortage cost transfer effect
First we consider a two-echelon supply chain with a price-only
contract between the manufacturer and the retailer. Let
c1 ¼ 20,c2 ¼ 40, g is constant and g1 varies. We analyze the impact
of the shortage cost transfer on the manufacturer’s optimal order
quantity, on the associated proﬁts of each echelon and on the
whole supply chain. Fig. 1 shows that the manufacturer’s optimal
order quantity decreases when g1 increases. This follows the
result in Lemma 1.
As discussed in Theorem 2, Fig. 2 shows that when g1
increases, the manufacturer’s proﬁt also increases, whereas the
proﬁts of both the retailer and the whole supply chain decrease. It
is worth noting that when the retailer takes responsibility for the
major part of a non-negligible shortage penalty g, she may end
with a negative proﬁt. This is not acceptable when it comes to
establishing a contract.
7.2. Three-echelon supply chain
In this section, we compare four types of supply chain: decen-
tralized (s, m, r), downstream-coordinated (s, mr), upstream-coordi-
nated (sm, r) and centralized. We set cr¼5, cm¼15 and cs¼40.113
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Please cite this article as: Seifert, R.W., et al., A three-echel
chain coordination. International Journal of Production Economics (For the decentralized case, the supplier is the Stackelberg
leader of the whole supply chain. Numerical results show that
the supplier tends to allocate the majority of the whole supply
chain’s proﬁt to herself, by setting a relatively high sales price. Ifon supply chain with price-only contracts and sub-supply
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Table 1
Decisions and expected proﬁts of ﬁrms with gs ¼ 6,gm ¼ 4,gr ¼ 2.
Supply chain qn Pn ps pm pr Wholesale price
Decentralized 363 20 185 12 513 5158 2514 t: 86
w: 122
Downstream-coordinated 709 41 846 30 125 p^mr¼ 11 721 86
Upstream-coordinated 719 42 341 p^sm¼ 26 634 15 707 98
Centralized 1388 58 776 – – – –
R.W. Seifert et al. / Int. J. Production Economics ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]8the retailer’s shortage penalty is relatively high, then the supplier’s
optimal solution may lead to a negative proﬁt for the retailer.
In order to make sure each ﬁrm is willing to participate, we consider
that the shortage penalty is allocated in the following way:
gs ¼ 6,gm ¼ 4,gr ¼ 2. Fig. 3 shows that the efﬁciency of the decen-
tralized supply chain (PnD=P
n
T , with P
n
D ¼ psðqns Þþpmðqns Þþprðqns Þ)
falls when the coefﬁcient of variation (CV) of the demand increases.
Concerning individual ﬁrms’ proﬁt in our example, an increase in
demand uncertainty increases the proﬁt ratio of the supplier
(psðqns Þ=PnD), but slightly decreases that of the manufacturer and
the retailer. The wholesale prices determined by both the supplier
and the manufacturer, calculated by Eqs. (7) and (8), decrease with
demand uncertainty (as shown in Fig. 4).
Table 1 displays for each type of supply chain considered, the
leader’s optimal order quantity qn, the associated proﬁt of the whole
supply chain Pn, the proﬁt of each ﬁrm ðps,pm and pr), and the
wholesale prices determined by the leader. For the coordinated
members of the sub-supply chains, we give the sum of their proﬁts
instead of individual ones.
The centralized supply chain is naturally the most efﬁcient of
the four supply chain types. It has the highest order quantity and
makes the largest proﬁt. It is hardly surprising that the decen-
tralized supply chain has the lowest order quantity and the worst
performance. Note that in the type of supply chain where the
upstream ﬁrm acts as leader and where the retailer has little
bargaining power, the retailer earns relatively small proﬁts.
As analyzed in Section 6, Table 1 shows that an upstream-
coordinated supply chain outperforms a downstream-coordinated
one. Moreover, both the supplier and the retailer would earn
higher proﬁts by acting alone rather than coordinating with the
manufacturer when sub-supply chain coordination is suggested.
The example in Table 1 also shows that, compared with a
decentralized supply chain, both the supplier and the retailer may
still prefer to join in a supply chain with sub-coordination even if
they have to coordinate with the manufacturer. This is because
that in a three-echelon supply chain with sub-coordination, it
may be possible to structure a win–win situation for all supply
chain members because the total proﬁt p^mr in the downstream-
coordinated supply chain exceeds pmþpr in the decentralized
supply chain, and p^sm in the upstream-coordinated supply chain
exceeds psþpm in the decentralized supply chain (Table 1).Q2
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1338. Conclusion
This paper considers a three-echelon supply chain with
random demand. We examined the following cases: a decentra-
lized supply chain, upstream coordination, downstream coordi-
nation and a centralized/coordinated supply chain. Using price-
only contracts, it is not as easy to study order quantity and
contracting decisions in a decentralized three-echelon supply
chain as it is in a two-echelon supply chain. We analyze the
shortage cost transfer effect in a two-echelon supply chain and
show that in our setting, the difference between upstream and
downstream coordination is equivalent to the shortage cost
transfer. From the point of view of the whole supply chain, it isPlease cite this article as: Seifert, R.W., et al., A three-echel
chain coordination. International Journal of Production Economics (more proﬁtable to coordinate between the supplier and the
manufacturer than between the manufacturer and the retailer.
Moreover, our analysis shows that both the supplier and the
retailer would prefer to act alone rather than to coordinate with
the manufacturer when sub-supply chain coordination is sug-
gested. This contradiction may partly explain the popularity of
price-only contracts in practice.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in several direc-
tions. First, we assume in this paper that the retail price p is
exogenously given. In reality, some retailers jointly determine the
retail price and order quantity. With the ability to determine the
retail price, the retailer’s proﬁt in a decentralized supply chain
may be improved. Second, the supply chain may contain more
than one ﬁrm in each echelon. The competition between ﬁrms in
each echelon might induce the supplier to produce more and the
retailer to order more, as discussed in He and Zhao (2011). It
would be interesting to investigate how this competition inﬂu-
ences the order quantity and contracting decisions in our setting.Acknowledgments
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